We’ve been hearing it for a long time, and we’ll most likely continue to hear it for a long time in the future. Most economists didn’t predict something like a sudden collapse in Russia soon after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

One of my favourite elaboration is an interview with Russian economist Natalia Zubarevich in 2023 who said back then about her country, ‘There Will Be no Collapses, but Rather a Viscous, Slow Sinking into Backwardness’.

And in a chapter in the 2023 book on “Russia’s Imperial Endeavor and Its Geopolitical Consequences” (highly recommended read), Hungarian scholar Dóra Győrffy concludes (opens pdf):

Although Western sanctions imposed on Russia did not immediately cripple the Russian economy, this does not mean they are ineffective. Russia has lost its most pros-perous markets in the EU for its energy products, while trade reorientation towards Asia faces major obstacles given the limitations of transport capacities such as gas pipelines or shipping. The outlook is even worse for its long-term growth prospects. The sanctions and the war have undermined all major factors of growth including access to capital and technology, the available quantity and quality of labor, the institutional system, and freedom. The war has made Russia a neo-backward country.

The relative certainty of the long-term decline of Russia stands in contrast to the uncertainties surrounding the prospects of post-war Ukraine. While success is far from guaranteed, Ukraine has a window of opportunity to leave its post-Soviet patronal structures behind, and build a resilient democracy, rule of law, and a strong market economy with Western support. The return of refugees, the inflow of Western capital for reconstruction, access to technology, assistance in institution building, and a strong social commitment to the idea of freedom provide a strong foundation for a new Ukraine embedded in the transatlantic alliance. Achieving this vision is the shared hope and responsibility of Ukraine and the West in their fight against autocracies.

Even if western nations could extricate their manufacturing needs from China, they would still be dependent on raw materials trade.

Some time ago there was a similar discussion in another thread, I did a brief research back then and post this with little edits as it fits here, too.

Western nations have already begun to diversify away from China, in their supply chains as well as in in raw materials. I admit that no Western country has arrived where it may want to be in its ‘de-risking’, but we must also look at China’s dependencies.

To name an example, China depends on imports for its supply of zirconium, a little-known critical mineral. Australia is the world’s largest producer and supplies China with 41 per cent of its imports, as China has already admitted.

The West also accounts for a high share of China’s imports of other important goods, such as some foodstuffs, certain raw materials, and other products. If we look at China’s import/export ratios, we see it is 65:1 for ores, slag, and ash, and with an import share of almost 50 per cent the West holds a high leverage in this sector.

Chinese import/export ratios for mineral fuels is 8:1 (although the Western share is below 20 per cent here as the majority comes form emerging economies), but for grain it is 21:1, for meat it is 36:1. (I hope that the West will never use food as some sort of ‘trade weapon’ - as China has been doing - but I am not sure.) There are may similar examples in the industry.

China is almost unilaterally dependent on ‘aircraft and spacecraft machinery and parts thereof’, an important product group. Although the import/export ratio is quite low (2:1), the western share of Chinese imports is some 97 percent, according to the German Economic Institute (opens pdf – German source). This category displays China’s highest import dependency on the West, and there is practically no substitution by alternative trading partners, and in China there is only a small degree of substitutability possible through an expansion of domestic production.

[If interested, EU-China and other trade data with relevant links can be found here.

Also, Europe is an attractive market as China’s EU export are rising - making a decisive contribution to the Chinese GDP.

So I don’t say that the EU or the West doesn’t depend on China, but I say that China depends also on the West if we look at the data of highly complex global supply chains. It’s certainly not a straightforward one-way dependency as conventional reporting (influenced by China?) make it seem in my opinion.

I wrote this comment in another thread, and it fits well also here.

The article says,

Beijing and Washington have been locked in a bitter trade war involving hefty tariffs during the second administration of US President Donald Trump, forcing Chinese exporters to pivot to other markets

Although this is true and it has certainly intensified the situation for China, the country had begun its trade diversion long before Trump’s tariff conundrum. And the reason was not abroad but at home: it was China’s weak domestic consumption as per a recent study by the European Central Bank (ECB).

It has found that the rise in China’s exports to the EU predates the latest tensions and coincides instead with the onset of weakness in demand at home in China, the ECB says.

In the fourth quarter of 2024 the average monthly value of domestic sales was around four times higher than total exports and over 28 times larger than exports to the United States. This suggests the pool of goods that could be redirected to the EU is much broader than trade data alone would suggest. Redirecting even a small share of domestic sales abroad could boost overall exports – including to the EU – more than a sizeable diversion of exports from the United States.

The ECB argues that the start of rising exports and slowing imports dates back to 2021, when China’s crisis in its domestic real estate market - typically an import-sensitive sector - sharply curtailed household demand.

At the same time, state-imposed manufacturing investment created overcapacity in industries that would otherwise face market-driven constraints, which eventually resulted in fierce price wars in Chinese home markets forcing companies to seek relief in exports.

The ECB writes:

This has eroded profit margins and discouraged spending in a deflationary environment with significant labour slack – prompting firms to redirect sales toward foreign markets.This shift reflects the “vent-for-surplus” theory of international trade, which posits that a demand-driven decline in domestic sales generates excess capacity that can be redirected abroad. The mechanism assumes fixed investment in the short term, which is particularly relevant in China, where investment is often guided by central planning. To expand abroad, firms must gain competitiveness in foreign markets. They typically do so by reducing short-run marginal costs and prices, or by accepting narrower profit margins, and in some cases even losses. - [Emphasis mine.]

As an addition, it is important to note that China’s strong exports to the world except to the US has less to do with trade diversion due to US President Trump’s tariff conundrum but with weak demand at home, as a recent study by the European Central Bank (ECB) has found.

While escalating trade tensions between the United States and China might result in a further diversion of Chinese exports to Europe, the rise in China’s exports to the EU predates the latest tensions and coincides instead with the onset of weakness in domestic demand in China, the ECB says.

In the fourth quarter of 2024 the average monthly value of domestic sales was around four times higher than total exports and over 28 times larger than exports to the United States. This suggests the pool of goods that could be redirected to the EU is much broader than trade data alone would suggest. Redirecting even a small share of domestic sales abroad could boost overall exports – including to the EU – more than a sizeable diversion of exports from the United States.

The ECB argues that the start of rising exports and slowing imports dates back to 2021, when China’s crisis in its domestic real estate market - typically an import-sensitive sector - sharply curtailed household demand.

At the same time, state-imposed manufacturing investment created overcapacity in industries that would otherwise face market-driven constraints, which eventually resulted in fierce price wars in Chinese home markets forcing companies to seek relief in exports.

The ECB writes:

This has eroded profit margins and discouraged spending in a deflationary environment with significant labour slack – prompting firms to redirect sales toward foreign markets.This shift reflects the “vent-for-surplus” theory of international trade, which posits that a demand-driven decline in domestic sales generates excess capacity that can be redirected abroad. The mechanism assumes fixed investment in the short term, which is particularly relevant in China, where investment is often guided by central planning. To expand abroad, firms must gain competitiveness in foreign markets. They typically do so by reducing short-run marginal costs and prices, or by accepting narrower profit margins, and in some cases even losses. - [Emphasis mine.]

Russia’s economy is in for a very rough long-term decline, according to practically all economists from within Russia and abroad, as Putin’s war made the situation in the country even worse than it was before.

In 2023, one year after the invasion started, there was an interview with Natalia Zubarevich, a Professor of the Department of Economic And Social Geography of Russia at the Moscow State University, claiming that in Russia ‘there will be no collapses, but rather a viscous, slow sinking into Bbackwardness.’ More than two years old, the interview is still highly accurate imho, and Ms. Zubarevich has foreseen everything so far.

Most economist also agree with your mentioned notion that Ukraine will get some help from the West to rebuild the country, and they may even be able to convince some Ukrainian refugees to return, and some migrants to settle in Ukraine.

The same is highly unlikely for Russia, though. Even long before the war, Putin’s government led many experts to a devastating conclusion for the brain drain from the country reveals that the Kremlinʼs authoritarian modernization has failed and deepens Russia’s longer-term problems, as the Finnish Institute of International Affairs in 2019 wrote, for example:

It is estimated that 1.6 to 2 million people have emigrated from Russia during the nearly 20-year period of Vladimir Putinʼs rule. In the light of these figures, some researchers talk about the fifth wave of emigration in Russian history. Emigration has accelerated particularly since Putin began his third presidency in 2012, and in 2017, for example, an estimated 377,000 people moved out of Russia.

So there is hope for Ukraine, but I don’t know of a single study that says the same about Russia.

EU producers of steel, aluminium, cement, etc. are already paying a fee for the emissions they produce. This is one reason why global trade is hopelessly distorted as only a few countries have a serious stance towards climate change. As this COP has shown, these are mainly countries form Europe, Latin America, and some Island countries. China as the world’s worst polluter is clearly not among these countries as we see once again.

@m33@lemmy.zip

EU producers of steel, aluminium, cement, etc. are already paying a fee for the emissions they produce. This is one reason why global trade is hopelessly distorted as only a few countries have a serious stance towards climate change. As this COP has shown, these are mainly countries form Europe, Latin America, and some Island countries. China as the world’s worst polluter is clearly not among these countries as we see once again.

donno if this is to make fun of lol party named trump or your mention of anti-propaganda.

Just look at OP’s post history.

I don’t pass by often here in this community. This is why I remember that OP posted this same report 6 days ago - and has now deleted it apparently only to repost it again (you can see my comment back then in my history, back then @schizoidman posted a link by Firstpost).

This is so ridiculous that you can only shake your head, but at least it fits to OP’s (and feddit.org’s?) anti-democratic propaganda feed.

What would you suggest instead?

There has been evidence of Russia weaponizing migration and using other measures against the EU to destabilize its societies even long before the invasion of Ukraine, but it’s important that we report on that when new investigations reveal new activities imho.

[Edit to correct a typo.]

What is our own artificially created oversupply?

Oh, yeah, what else is new in Europe?

Firstpost is a media outlet known for low-quality reports including misinformation and disinformation.

No, I shouldn’t re-read with the context of what you said, because what you said is out of touch and has nothing to do with the study that you apparently didn’t read.

This is likely why you engage in insults. I have no interest in a discussion like that.

What an absurdly weird framing of this study that makes it easy to infer that you didn’t even click the link.

But India’s Russian oil shipments are expected to slow starting in November after the U.S. sanctioned two major suppliers last month in an effort to end Moscow’s war in Ukraine. This prompted Indian refiners to pause new orders and look for alternatives in spot markets.

I don’t know why such headlines about India continuing to buy Russian crude are popping up frequently. This is short-term only.

India’s top importer Reliance Industries Ltd, which has a long-term supply contract with Russia’s Rosneft, has already announced it will stop taking Russian crude. And so have Mangalore Refinery, Petrochemicals Ltd (two other major refiners from India, both state-controlled) as well as HPCL-Mittal Energy, a joint venture of steel tycoon Lakshmi Mittal’s Mittal Energy and the Hindustan Petroleum Corporation.

All these companies will stop buying from Russia by the end of this quarter as by their own announcements. Indian refiners are increasing procurement from the Middle East, Latin America, West Africa, Canada, and the US.

This is already known for some time, you’d find many reports on web (I’ve even read posts about it here on Lemmy if I am not mistaken, but I am not sure about that).

Yes. As Natalia Zubarevich, professor of the Department of Economic And Social Geography of Russia of the Moscow State University, predicted in June 2023 about the Russian economy: ‘There Will Be no Collapses, but Rather a Viscous, Slow Sinking into Backwardness’

I liked her statements back then and have been remembering them whenever I read reports like this one on the Russian economy. The interview is more than 2 years old, and with hindsight we now must say that Professor Zubarevich seems to have foreseen everything. I never heard of her before but she must be a very good economist.

Not just emission but a broader picture of climate actions:

• USA - critically insufficient
• China - highly insufficient
• EU - insufficient

These are the largest emitters, you’ll find all others on the site.

China is ahead of the US, behind the EU and many other (Western and non-Western) countries (with almost no country or bloc is on track to reach the Paris agreement targets). These are simple facts. As the world’s largest polluter, China should do much more than it does, but it seems there is not even a willingness to do so.

I won’t comment on your accusation of being biased. I am not long here on Lemmy, but the reaction here if and when you criticize China is often weird. It’s certainly not all, but some people appear to be personally insulted if you just say something critical of this regime. That’s often not a sane reaction.

This doesn’t make sense. China’s new climate plans are insufficient as per a wide range of global experts claiming the 10% is by far not enough.